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CASE COMMENTS
pleting his business. The plaintiff could not be a business visitor
if, at the time of her entrance, her husband was not in that category.
The length of time that the husband consumed in waiting after
buying the lottery ticket did not appear in the opinion. The court
ruled, in upholding the directed verdict for the defendant, that there
was no reasonable ground for a contrary verdict.
The law applied in this case is probably sound, but the court's
definition of "unreasonable time" must forever remain a mystery. It
is improbable that the husband, hence the plaintiff, could have been
denied an invitation because of lack of mutuality or inducement, or
because of the illegal act. The choice was between debatable law
squarely applicable to the facts and a questionable application of undoubted law. The court chose the latter alternative.
ROBERT P.

SMITH, JR.

TRADE REGULATION: BOXING AS INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
United States v. InternationalBoxing Club, 75 Sup. Ct. 259 (1955)
Defendants were engaged in the promotion of professional boxing
matches in several states. The United States alleged that defendants'
activities, including negotiation of contracts, leasing of arenas, sale
of tickets, and sale of motion picture, broadcasting and telecasting
rights, comprised interstate commerce and that these activities were
carried on in such a manner as to violate the Sherman Act.' The
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and the case
went to the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting
Act.2 HELD, defendants' activities constituted interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Judgment reversed, Justices
Frankfurter and Minton dissenting.
Authority to regulate commerce among the several states is delegated to Congress by the Constitution. 3 The Sherman Act,4 the pur'26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1952).
232 STAT. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §29 (1952).
'U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, d. 3.
-26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1952).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol8/iss3/18

2

Van
Deventer: Trade
Interstate Commerce
REVIEW
FLORIDA Boxing
LAV as
OFRegulations:
UNIVERSITY
pose of which is to thwart monopolies in interstate commerce and
suppress attempts to create them, was enacted under this authority.
The courts encounter difficulty in determining which activities
are "interstate commerce." In early cases the meaning given the term
was very narrow, and a trade or business was not classed as interstate
commerce unless a substantial part of it was involved in the crossing
of state lines. Thus insurance companies, for example, were initially
held not to be engaged in interstate commerce.? More than thirty
years ago it was held in Federal Base Ball Club v. National League
that the interstate activities engaged in by professional baseball clubs
were merely incidental to their primary purpose of furnishing local
entertainment and that professional baseball hence did not come within the purview of the Sherman Act. More recent cases tend toward
a broader meaning of interstate commerce; touring stage plays, 7 sugai
beet production,8 wheat farming, 9 and insurance- ° have been held to
be activities subject to regulation under the Sherman Act.
In keeping with this trend, the Court in the instant decision concluded that boxing may be interstate commerce. The Court noted
that more than twenty-five per cent of defendants' revenues are derived from the sale of motion picture, broadcasting, and telecasting
rights to the boxing contests promoted by them; all three of these
media of communication have been held to be interstate commerce."
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,"°- the Court again exempted

professional baseball from the operation of the Sherman Act. The
decision was an application of the rule of stare decisis and was based
solely on the authority of the Federal Base Ball Club case. In its per
curiam opinion the Court noted that in the years that have passed
since the rendering of the decision in the Federal Base Ball Club case
Congress has had the ruling of that case under consideration but
5Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)

168 (1868).
6259 U.S. 200 (1922).
,United States v. Shubert, 75 Sup. Ct. 277 (1955); Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647

(2d Cir. 1945).
SMandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
9Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

'oUnited States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
lUnited States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Federal Radio
Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933); Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950).
12346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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